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The Extension of Implied Warranty Theory To 
Contracts Of Professional Service
Sales law im poses the risk that goods wil be unsuitable for the buyer’s 
purpose on the seller. W here a buyer who wants goods for a particular 
purpose mak^s this known to the seller so as to show that he relies on his 
skill or ju d g m en t, an im plied term  o f  fitness for purpose arises.1 T h u s, a 
com puter firm  which sells a com p uter system to handle its buyer’s account­
ing needs will be liable if  the program m e cannot do the jo b  unless this 
obligation has been disclaim ed.2 T h e  seller’s liability is said to be strict in 
the sense that he is responsible even for latent defects which he could not 
have anticipated at the tim e o f  contracting. I f  he wants a lesser responsi­
bility, he m ust contract fo r it.
T h e  assum ption is quite d ifferent in a contract o f  professional service. 
T h e  law does not usually imply a warranty that the service will be reasonably 
fit for its intended purpose but only a term  that the professional will use 
reasonable care and skill.8 T h u s, a solicitor who sells his client an u nen­
forceable m ortgage is thought to be responsible only if  he was negligent.4 
It seems it is insufficient to establish m erely that the service did not achieve 
its intended purpose.
W hat is the distinction between these two transactions which justifies 
such a radical d ifference in the assum ptions which the law makes in ap­
proaching each? In both o f  the exam ples given above, the buyer’s purpose 
was com m unicated to the seller, the buyer relied on the seller’s expertise, the 
product requested was som ething fit for the buyer’s purpose, and the seller 
unqualifiedly agreed to supply it. A com m ensurate .measure o f  skill and 
expertise can be said to have gone into the production process and there 
was an analagous risk o f  latent defects.
1The Sale o f Goods Act, R .S .N .B ., 1973, c .S -1 , ss. 15(a). T h e  New Brunswick Act, like its counterparts in the 
o ther Canadian provinces, is m odelled on The Sale o f Goods Act 1893 (U .K .) c. 71. A com parative table of 
the various C anadian and the U .K . provisions is found in Fridm an, Sale of Goods in Canada, 2d ed., (T o ro n to : 
Carswell, 1979) at 4-5 .
2Burroughs Business Machines Ltd. v. Feed-nte Mills (1973) 42 D .I..R . 3d 303 (M an. C .A .); see also Public 
Utilities Commission o f Waterloo v. Burroughs Business Machines Ltd. (1974) 52 D .L .R . 3d 481 (Ont. C .A .).
’ Dugdale and Stanton, Professional Negligence, (London: Butterw orths, 1982) at 103 et seq. T h e  distinction 
between the term s implied in a contract for the supply o f  goods and in a contract for services generally is 
codified in the proposed U.K . Supply o f  Goods and Services Act 1982; see Clark and Stephenson, 132 N .L .J. 
1103. Part 1 o f  the Act introduces term s as to title, description, m erchantability, fitness for purpose, and 
sample sim ilar to those found in sections 13 to 16 o f  the Sale o f Goods Act. supra, note 1, into all o ther 
contracts for the supply o f goods, irrespective o f  form . Part 11, which is m erely intended to codify the 
supposed existing com m on law in this respect, provides that in contracts for the supply o f  a service, there 
is an implied term  that the supplier will carry out the service with reasonable care and skill and within a 
reasonable time.
4Central & Eastern Trust Company v. Rafuse and Cordon (1982 ) 53 N .S.R. 2d 69  (S .C ., T .D .). Liability was
alleged in this case only on the ground o f  professional negligence o f  which the solicitor was acquitted.
Apparently no argum ent was advanced that the solicitor had warranted the validity o f  the m ortgage.
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T h e  distinction is not based on the status per se o f  a professional versus 
a com m ercial m an. Indeed , a com puter consultant m ight well be regarded 
as a professional in the m odern usage o f  that term . And, as we shall see, the 
courts have readily im plied a warranty o f  fitness for purpose in contracts 
involving the supply o f  goods by a professional in the classic sense.
N or can the distinction be grounded on the conceptual d ifference 
between a contract for the sale o f  goods and a contract o f  service. Again, 
as we shall see, th ere is a growing ju d icial willingness to imply a warranty 
obligation in a contract o f  professional service w here the service is related 
to the production o f  som ething tangible. Tw o separate rationales are used 
to effect that result: (1) the warranty is im posed by analogy to sale o f  goods 
law; (2) the warranty is im plied in fact on the basis o f  the actual, albeit 
unexpressed, com m on intention o f  the parties in the particular circu m ­
stances o f  a case.
Do the tangible product cases m erely illustrate limited exceptions to the 
usual negligence-based standard o f  professional liability? O r, do they sup­
port a m ore generalized extension o f  im plied warranty theory to the p rofes­
sional services context?
IMPLICATION OF A WARRANTY OF FITNESS 
FOR PURPOSE IN THE TANGIBLE PRODUCT CASES
T h e  Sale of Goods Act5 is viewed as prim arily a codification o f  com m on 
law. T h u s, the courts have considered them selves free  to apply its provisions 
“if  relevant in principle and appropriate in the circum stances"6 by analogy 
to transactions not falling within the direct scope o f  the Act. T h is  technique 
has been utilized to imply a warranty o f  fitness for purpose in the following 
types o f  contracts involving a professional service:7
1. with resp ect to  the m aterials com p on en t in a con tract u n d er which both  
m aterials and a professional service are  to be supplied.
2. with resp ect to the finished chattel in a co n tract w here both services and  
m aterials are  to be in co rp orated  by the professional in its production
Dodd v. Wilson8 illustrates the first type o f  transaction. T h e re , a veter­
inarian was held to have impliedly w arranted the fitness o f  certain contam ­
inated serum  which he had in jected into the p lain tiff farm er’s cows. T h e  
veterinarian had not been negligent either in adm inistering the serum  or
5Supra, footnote 1.
6T h is  is the wording adopted by the U niform  Law C onferen ce in ss. 2 .2 (4 ) o f  the Uniform Salt o f Goods Act 
which codifies the com m on law practice in this regard.
’O ntario  Law Reform  Com m ission, Report on Salt o f Goods, Vol. I. Ministry o f  the A ttorney-G eneral, 1979, 
at 45  et seq.
»¡1946J 2 All E.R 691.
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failing to detect that it was contam inated. W arranty liability was imposed 
on the basis that the fa rm er’s rights should not depend on the conceptual 
distinction between a contract for the sale o f  goods and one for work and 
m aterials, viz., on w hether he had bought the serum  in a separate trans­
action o r in con junction  with services. In  the form er case, he could have 
relied on the im plied condition o f  fitness for purpose in the Sale of Goods 
Act. It was only reasonable that he should have the benefit o f  an analogous 
term  in the latter case, especially since the veterinarian could seek indem nity 
from  his own supplier u nder his pure contract for the sale o f  goods.
T h e  rationale for im plying a w arranty o f  fitness for purpose in the 
first type o f  transaction is expressed in term s o f  a policy: the desirability 
o f  ensuring a continuous contractual chain o f  liability based on the same 
standard from  the ultim ate buyer back to the seller who originally put the 
defective goods on the m arket. A d ifferen t rationale must be em ployed to 
support the im plication o f  a warranty in the second type o f  transaction. 
i.e., contracts w here the professional service is incorporated  into the pro- 
duction o f  a finished chattel. H ere there is no seller behind the professional 
against whom liability is ultim ately sought.
In Samuels v. Davis,9 D uParcq L .J . held that w here a dentist undertakes 
to m ake a denture for a patient, a term  is to be im plied in the contract that 
the dentist will supply a d entu re which is reasonably fit for the purpose 
for which it is intended. It is a “m atter o f  legal ind ifference w hether the 
contract be regarded as one for the sale o f  goods or one o f  service to do 
work and supply m aterial”.10
T h e  dentist had not been guilty o f  negligence o r lack o f  skill in con ­
structing the denture. However, D uParcq L .J. distinguished the case o f  the 
professional in the practice o f  his profession generally, where the obligation 
is to take reasonable care and skill, from  the case “where a chattel is ulti­
mately to be delivered ,11 in which event the professional’s obligation is one 
o f  im plied warranty unless disclaim ed. In m aking this distinction, DuParcq 
L .J . must have recognized that an equal or even greater degree o f  care 
and skill is em ployed in the m anu factu re o f  many goods. T h e  fact that it 
is a professional manufacturer acting in the course o f  his profession who
9[1943] K B  526 
]0Ibtd. , at 527 .
ulbtd, at 5 2 9 -30 : " I cannot doubt that it som eone goes to a professional man, however em inent, and
whatever skill the practice o f  his profession mav dem and, and says: 'will vou make me som ething which 
will fit a particular part o f  my body?' as evervbodv does sav impliedly who asks that a denture mav be 
m ade, and the professional gentlem an says ‘yes', without qualification, he is then warranting that when he 
has m ade the article, it will fit the part o f  the bodv in question. I think one is getting into the region of 
fancy if o ne assumes that any o ther contract is made by implication. O f  course there are many cases where 
no professional man would m ake such a contract, but in those cases he would undoubtedly make an express 
contract limiting his liability . . .  I f  a dentist takes out a tooth or a surgeon rem oves an appendix, he is 
bound to take reasonable care and to show such skill as mav be expected from  a qualified practitioner. 
T h e  case is entirely d ifferen t w here a chattel is ultimately to be delivered."
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produces the goods, rath er than a com m ercial m anu factu rer acting in the 
course o f  his business, should not o f-itse lf change the im plied obligation.
T h e  im plication o f  a warranty in these types o f  transactions does not, 
at first blush, im pinge greatly on the traditional negligence standard o f  
professional liability (unless o f  course one happens to be a dentist, druggist,12 
optom etrist or the like). Essentially, all the courts have done here is apply 
the principle, “treat like cases alike”; i.e., treat the professional in the same 
fashion as a seller o f  goods would be treated in cases where the professional 
has attained that dual status eith er by selling goods along with his p rofes­
sional skills or by using his professional skills to produce goods. Q uite 
rightly, in this process, the courts have also treated as irrelevant any co n ­
ceptual distinction which exists between a contract for the sale o f  goods 
and one o f  service.
T h ese  decisions, nonetheless, suggest a m ore dram atic extension o f  
the w arranty obligation. Firstly, it would be anom olous to imply d ifferent 
standards o f  contractual responsibility to the two com ponents in a contract 
for work and m aterials.18 I f  the defect lay with the services rath er than the 
m aterials, the bu yer would then have to establish negligence and not merely 
unsuitability. Logic and consistency require that a warranty be im plied in 
respect of the services as well. T h is  possibility is m ade explicit in the Samuels 
v. Davis'4-type transaction w here, in ef fect, the warranty is im plied in respect 
o f  the p rofessional’s services in constructing  the requested product. T h u s, 
while neither line o f  authority purports directly to extend im plied warranty 
theory into the realm  o f  pure services, both contain the seed o f  that result.
IB A v. E M I Electronics, 15 a recent English decision in the design en g i­
neering  context, recognizes this logical extension. T h e  case involved liability 
for the sudden collapse o f  a television mast. T h e  first defendants (EM I) 
were the m ain contractors for the design, construction and erection o f  the 
mast. T h e  second defendants (B IC ) has been em ployed by EM I as their 
subcontractors for the design, construction and erection o f  the mast. T h e  
p lain tiff ow ners o f  the mast (IB A ) claim ed against EM I, alleging both 
breach o f  contract and negligence, and against B IC  alleging negligence.
12In Ex parte Boots Cash Chemists Southern Ltd. (1920) 89  L .). (K .B .) 55 , Reading C .J. held that "th e m aking 
up o f  a prescription and its transference for a price to the person who ordered  it is a sale within the
m eaning o f  the [Profiteering] Act". He noted that the value o f everv article is made up o f  two things —  
the value o f its com ponent parts and the cost o f the labour expended on it.
,sln  its Report, supra, note 7., at 48 , the O L R C  noted this anom oly, but did not “feel called upon to justify
the distinction” since any change in the existing law "with respect to the scope of the implied warranty of 
care and skill in a contract for services or the labour com ponent in a contract for work and m aterials" fell 
quite outside “its term s o f re feren ce”. T h u s, the only change recom m ended in this respect in the existing 
law of sale of goods was the inclusion o f  a provision m aking the implied term s as to title, m erchantability
and fitness applicable to goods supplied under a contract for work and m aterials. This provision was adopted 
in ss. 5 .15 (2 ) o f  the Uniform Sale o f goods Act, supra, note 6.
usupra, footnote 9.
■'(1978) 11 B .L .R . 38 (C .A .); (1 9 8 0 ) 14 B .L .R . 1 (H .L .); Dugdale and Stanton (1981) 131 N .L .J. 583.
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EM I also sought to recover over against B IC  in the event it was found 
liable to I BA . It was clear that the collapse o f  the mast was due neither to 
faults in w orkm anship nor the use o f  inap propriate or defective m aterials; 
it was the design alone that was unsuitable and that had been the exclusive 
work o f  BIC/s engineers.
T h e  C ou rt o f  A ppeal held that there was an im plied obligation as to 
the fitness for purpose o f  the design both in the contract between IB  A and 
EM I and in the subcontract between EM I and B IC . Counsel had argued 
against this finding on the ground “that design is norm ally the function o f  
a professional man and that the law is clear that no professional man 
w arrants m ore than the exercise o f  reasonable care and skill according to 
the accepted standards o f  his profession; he never w arrants a successful 
outcom e”.16
In the C ou rt’s view, there was no reason why the duty should be only 
one o f  reasonable care if  bad design rath er than the supply o f  bad m aterials 
were involved. A builder contracting  to build and sell a house is under an 
im plied obligation that the house shall be fit for habitation when com pleted ; 
a fortiori, one who contracts to design, supply and erect a mast should be 
“at least u nd er som e obligation as to its fitness for the purpose for which 
he knows it is intended to be used upon its com pletion”.17
M ore significantly, the C ou rt recognized Samuels v. Davis18 as authority 
for the proposition that a professional may be held to be under an im plied 
w arranty obligation in respect o f  his services where the end product is 
som ething tangible and not m erely under an obligation to use reasonable 
care and skill. T h e  analogy here to sale o f  goods law and products liability 
theory is clear. I f  a m anu factu rer or seller o f  goods cannot evade the 
im plied warranty by asserting that the defect lay with services rather than 
m aterials then neither should the professional engineer be able to do so 
in the building context.
IB A  had not relied on the skill o f  E M I, its im m ediate contractor, for 
the design o f  the mast and in fact EM I had not taken any part in it. However, 
the C ou rt considered  it “should not be too astute”19 in requiring reliance 
on skill and ju d g m en t for the purposes o f  the im plied warranty in the main 
contract if  to do so would break the chain o f  contractual liability and thereby 
prevent ultim ate recovery against B IC , the party responsible for the d e­
fective design and upon whose skill and ju d g m en t both IB A  and EM I had
17Ibid ., at 51 (C .A .)
isSupra, footnote 9.
l<)Supra, footnote 15, at 52 (C .A .)
16lb id .. at 50  (C.A .)
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undoubtedly relied. As in Dodd v. Wilson,'20 the C ourt em phasized the use 
o f  the im plied w arranty as a m eans o f  ensuring that liability on a consistent 
standard is ultim ately brought back to the original seller. T h e  im portant 
d ifference h ere was that the original seller was a professional who had 
supplied a defective service, not defective goods.
In the H ouse o f  Lords, the conclusion o f  the C ourt o f  Appeal that the 
fitness o f  the design had been im pliedly w arranted both by B IC  to EM I 
and by EM I to IB  A ws accepted in obiter21 by several o f  the Lords22 and 
not rejected  by any o f  them .23 Lord Scarm an addressed most directly the 
argum ent that where a design “requires the exercise o f  professional skill, 
the obligation is no m ore than to exercise the care and skill o f  the ordinarily 
com petent m em ber o f  the p rofession”.24 C iting Samueb v. Davis,25 it was his 
view that consistency with the law o f  sale o f  goods required the general 
principle that “in the absence o f  any term  (express or to be im plied) ne­
gativing the obligation, one who contracts to design an article for a purpose 
made known to him undertakes that the design is reasonably fit for the 
purpose”.26
Lord Scarm an ’s general principle is not by its term s restricted to cases 
where the professional is em ployed to incorporate his design services into 
the ultim ate product. It also encom passes the supply o f  design services 
simp hater.27 In an earlier case, Greaves v. Baynham, Miekle,28 the English Court 
o f  Appeal had im plied a w arranty o f  fitness in a contract w here design 
services alone were involved. T h e  p lain tiff contractors had em ployed the
Supra, footnote 8.
2 ,In the H ouse o f  Lords, it was found that B IC  had been negligent in its design o f  the mast and that EMI 
had contractually accepted responsibility (including responsibility for B IC ’s negligence) to IB A  for the 
design. H ence, the observations o f  the Lords on the implied warranty o f  fitness issue were not necessary 
to the result.
n Supra, footnote 16, per Viscount D ilhorne, at 26 . per Lord Fraser, at 44-45 , per Lord Scarm an, at 47- 
48.
n Hnd., Lord Scarm an, at 26 , simply agreed with his brothers as to the disposition of the appeal for the 
reasons they gave and Lord Edm und-Davis, at 33 , p referred  not “to express a final conclusion" on the 
m atter.
u lbut, at 47.
'ibSupra. footnote 9.
26Supra, footnote 15, at 48.
27Dugdale and Stanton, supra, note 3, point out at 107 that it would be inappropriate to draw a distinction
l)etween one who designs and one who designs and supplies an article: “ In the first place, such a distinction 
would give a client greater protection under a 'package deal' contract where the con tractor is responsible 
for design than he would have under the norm al schem e using a consultant to provide the design. Secondly, 
where the design responsibility was divided between the consultant and the contractor it would seem 
difficult to justify a d ifferen ce in the extent of their design duties. T hird ly , where the contractor had 
engaged the consultant, it could result in the con tractor being under a strict duty to the em ployer as 
regards design but only able to pass on liability to the consultant responsible for the design if there was 
negligence".
»(1975] 3 All F..R. 99; [1975] I W.L.R. 1095 (C.A.)
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defendants, a firm of consultant structural engineers, to design a factory 
warehouse. The warehouse was built by the plaintiffs according to the 
defendants’ design. Within a few months of completion, cracks appeared 
in the first floor. The plaintiffs were liable to the warehouse owners to 
remedy the defects. They claimed indemnity from the defendants.
It was held that the defendants had impliedly warranted the fitness of 
their design. The Court emphasized that the warranty arose from the special 
facts29 of the case and that the decision laid down no general principle as 
to the obligation of the professional man. However, the special facts were 
rather common place. Firstly, it had been made known to the engineers 
that the floor would have to be strong enough to withstand vibrations 
produced by the random movement of fork-lifts. Secondly, the defendants 
had not qualified in any way their agreement to undertake the design. This 
relatively limited set of variables seems capable enough of yielding a general 
principle: where the purpose for which a design service is required is made 
known, the professional is under a contractual duty to provide a design 
which is reasonably suitable for that purpose in the absence of evidence 
negativing the obligation. Certainly, the one Canadian case’0 in which Greaves 
was applied is easily explicable in terms of such a general principle. It need 
not be added that the principle yielded parallels the conclusion arrived at 
by Lord Scarman as a matter of law in IBA v. E M I Electronics.3I
A FURTHER EXTENSION?
The courts appear willing to construe contractual dealings with design 
professionals as implying a warranty of fitness for prupose. Where the 
warranty is imposed by analogy to sales law, the reasoning in IBA v. EM I 
Electronics32 limits further development to cases where the ultimate purpose 
of the service is the production of something tangible. The warranty implied 
in fact in Greaves33 is factually (if not theoretically) limited in a similar 
fashion. Is this a relevant cut-off point for any further extension?
Where the professional service requested is related to the production 
of something tangible, the reasonable commercial expectations of the client 
are more apt to approximate those of a buyer of goods than where pure 
professional services are involved. Much of what is sold in the latter context 
consists obviously of opinion or advice. The professional’s undertaking is 
implicitly qualified by words such as “this is my opinion” or “this course of
KM rd)uck and Budovtlch Ltd. v. AD I Limited (1980) 33 N.B.R. 2d 271 (Q B ). Sec also. X B  Tel. x .Jo h n  M an/on  




n Supra, footnote 28.
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action has a good probability of success”. In these circumstances, the usual 
negligence standard of professional responsibility accurately reflects the 
common understanding of both parties.
However, the fact that pure professional services contracts are less apt 
to m n to a type is an insufficient reason for applying the negligence stand­
ard in cases where a parallel can be drawn to the sale of goods context. 
That is, where the client communicates to the professional the purpose for 
which the service is required so as to show he is relying on the professional’s 
skill and judgm ent to provide him with a service suitable for that purpose 
and the professional neither expressly or impliedly qualifies his agreement 
to supply it. The example given at the beginning of this discussion illustrates 
the type of pure services transaction in which these elements are likely to 
be found. Why should the solicitor who has sold his client an unenforceable 
mortgage be relieved of liability if negligence cannot be established, even 
though he did not initially advise his client that his undertaking was limited 
to the exercise of reasonable care and skill? O f what relevance is the tangible 
product distinction here?
The answer to that may depend, in part, on the theory one embraces 
as the basis for implied warranty liability in the law of sale of goods. This 
seems to have been the subject of some debate at both the judicial’4 and 
academic35 level. Prosser has discerned three distinct theories (which will 
be called, for convenience of reference, the misrepresentation, contract 
and policy theories, respectively):
1. The warranty ¿5 a misrepresentation o f  fact. The seller has asserted, 
whether expressly or by his conduct, that the goods are o f a particular kind, 
quality or character, and the buyer has purchased in reliance upon that assertion.
This is obviously a tort theory, closely allied to the cases o f deceit; and it differs 
from deceit only in that it imposes strict liability for innocent misrepresentations, 
in the absence o f any “scienter” in the form o f  knowledge o f their falsitv or lack 
o f belief in their truth . . .
2. T he warranty has in fact been agreed upon bv the parties as an unex­
pressed term o f the contract o f  sale. T he seller has contracted to deliver described 
goods, and it is understood that they are to have certain qualities; but that 
understanding has not been embodied in the agreement. Nevertheless the court, 
by interpreting the language used, the conduct o f  the parties and the circum­
stances o f the case, finds that it is there. Such a contract term “implied in fact” 
dif fers from an express agreement only in that it is circumstantially proved. . . .
3. The warranty is imposed by the law. It is read into the contract by the 
law without regard to whether the parties intended it in fact; it arises merely 
because the goods have been sold at all. This theory is o f  course one o f  policy.
The loss due to defective goods is placed upon the seller because he is best able 
to bear it and distribute it to the public, and because it is considered that the
siW addam s, Strict Liability, Warranties and the Sale oj Goods (1969) 19 U .T .L .J. 157, at 157-163; Farnsw orth, 
Implied W arranties of Quality in Non-sales Cases (1957) 57 Col. L. Rev. 653, at 670-674.
S4Dodd v. Wilson, supra, note 8; Greaves v. Baynham Meikle, supra, note 28, especially at 103-104.
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buyer is entitled to protection at the seller’s expense. It is perhaps idle to inquire 
whether the basis o f  such a liability is contract or tort. It partakes o f the nature 
o f  both, and in either case it is liability without fault.5®
It is Prosser’s view that “the courts have flitted cheerfully from one 
theory to another as the facts may demand, always tending to an increasing 
extent to favour the buyer and find the warranty”.57 This observation also 
holds true in the brief evolution of implied warranty which we have wit­
nessed in the design services cases. In IBA v. E M I Electronics,38 the warranty 
in the sub-contract was implied as a matter of principle by analogy to sales 
law, presumably on the basis of the misrepresentation theory. However, 
when IBA’s lack of reliance on EMI’s design expertise threatened to negate 
the implication of a similar warranty in the main contract, the court quickly 
reverted to policy justifications to support its imposition.39 Greaves,40 it will 
be remembered, involved the implication of a warranty on the basis of the 
contract theory. This is the least controversial and most flexible basis (though 
arguably the least honest) and the Court may therefore have preferred it 
since design services simpliciter were involved.
On the basis of which theory, if any, might our non-negligent solicitor 
be held to have impliedly warranted the fitness of his service for the mort­
gagee’s intended purpose? Here there seems room for the implication of 
a warranty on the basis of the contract theory. Certainly, this result rep­
resents the client’s understanding. To paraphrase Lord Ellenborough, “the 
purchaser cannot be supposed to buy [a mortgage] to lay [it] on a dunghill”.41 
The solicitor may protest that he sells a “service, not insurance”.12 But, 
there will usually be objective evidence to show that his ignorance or the 
impossibility o f performance is irrelevant; he has, in fact, agreed to take 
that risk on himself. This objective evidence is to be found in the certificate 
which a solicitor is commonly asked to give his client indicating that the 
client has received a valid mortgage.43 Indeed, the mortgagee would o r­
dinarily not retain the solicitor if he refused to so certify. As Zubei j.A . 
has pointed out in the context of land conveyancing:
“ Prosser, The Implied W arranty of M erchantable Quality. (1943) 27 M inn. L. R*". . i i / .  at 122-124.
” lbtd., at 124-125.
Supra , footnote  15. 
wSee the  discussion in the  text of this com m ent at 211-212.
"'Supra, footnote  28.
"G ardiner v. G ra\ (1815) 4 C am p. 144: 171 Kng. Rep. 4<i
^H igh ligh t Properties v. John  .4. Hlurne i s  Assoc., Engineers. 25 Cal. App. 3d 848. 102 Cal. Rptr. 259 ( 1972)
*sIn Central i s  Eastern Trust Company v. R afuse and Cordon, supra, note 4. it was found  at 73 that “Mr. C ordon 's  
C ertificate o f  T itle, following com pletion o f  the transaction , stated that the plaintiff had obtained a valid 
first m ortgage. F u rtherm ore , in the  discovery evidence tendered  by the  plaintiff, lit- stated lie had a 
responsibility to see that the plaintiff had obtained a valid m ortgage". It is subm itted this evidence is not 
atypical.
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In the ordinary course a client relies on his solicitor to guarantee the title that
he certifies. The fee charged is calculated upon the sale price o f  the title certified
and arguably the risk assumed.44
This reference to “the risk assumed” cannot be to the risk of being 
held negligent. The exercise of reasonable care is a duty which the law 
casts on the professional in any event. Rather, it must be to the risk that 
the mortgage is not a valid charge, 'n  these circumstances, had they been 
asked at the time of contracting, both parties would undoubtedly have 
agreed that the solicitor’s responsibility was to ensure that his client received 
a valid mortgage. This inquiry is the traditional test employed for implying 
a term on the basis of the contract theory.
What about the more common case where it is clear that the parties 
were of opposite minds on the nature of the professional's undertaking 
and there is no objective circumstantial evidence of the type noted above 
to overcome the divergence? Here there is no room for the implication of 
a term in fact.
Ormindale Holdings Ltd. x. Ray, Wolfe, Etc.*5 illustrates the kind of factual 
context in which resort to the contract theory is impossible. However, as 
we shall see, the void, theoretically at least, is quickly filled. In that case, 
the plaintiffs sought damages for losses suf fered as a result of accepting 
the advice of the defendants, a firm of lawyers, with respect to a scheme 
for conversion of rental accommodatin to long-term tenure. The scheme 
was premised on an apparent loophole in the governing legislation. It 
“called for incorporation o f sixteen new companies, creation of complicated 
intercorporate agreements, obtaining the consent of the Superintendent 
of Brokers for a public offering of shares, the training of real estate sales­
man, an advertising campaign and physical improvement of the suites to 
be sold. All this the plaintiffs undertook in reliance on the defendants’ 
advice.”46 It was only after 39 suites had been sold that the project was 
brought to a halt. The legality of the scheme was referred to the courts. 
It was found that the loophole upon which the scheme was premised had 
never existed. *
The plaintiffs claimed expenditures of several thousands of dollars 
which they had lost in attempting to implement the scheme as well as their 
anticipated profit of $5,500,000. Their claim was based both on breach of 
an alleged implied warranty that the conversion scheme would be effective 
and on professional negligence.
The defendants had throughout expressed complete confidence in the 
scheme, had mentioned no risk of its failure, and at no time had specifically
44K e tn ilt v. S tn n g rr  (1982) 21 R.P.R. 44 (O nt. C.A.) at 51. Professional negligence was established in this
case.
45( 1981) 1 16 D.L.R. 3d 346 (B.C.S.C.), affirmed (1982) 135 D.L.R 3d 577 (B.C.C.A.)
46Ibid.. at 347.
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indicated that it might not be sound in law or that it represented only their 
opinion on the relevant legislation. It was argued that these circumstances 
gave rise to an implied warranty of effectiveness. Taylor J. rejected this 
“novel p roposition”47 ra th e r sum m arily: “While the defendan ts 
. . . rendered advice in a very confident vein, it was [not] given in way 
which would take the parties out of the normal relationship of solicitor and 
client, so as to create instead a contractual bargain between them as to the 
state of the law”.48
The defendants had not been negligent in forming their opinion on 
the proper interpretation of the relevant legislation. Their liability for 
professional negligence ultimately rested on whether they had been in 
breach of duty in failing to warn their clients that an argument could be 
made against the legality of the scheme. Taylor J. accepted that a solicitor 
is under a general duty to warn his client of any risks inherent in following 
advice. However, the plaintiffs had not, in fact, been misled into believing 
there was no risk.
T he lawyer’s advice in matters o f  statutory interpretation can never be more 
than an opinion. The defendants might have said: ‘This is our opinion; we have 
complete confidence in it; but you must understand that it could be wrong. No 
one can be certain what a Court will decide on a question o f law. and even when 
a Court had decided, its decision may be upset on appeal.' But I do not think 
a lawyer is required to give that sort o f  formalistic warning to experienced 
business clients. I cannot accept that the plaintiffs were misled into believing the 
advice they received was other than a legal opinion.
While a lawyer might have to warn o f consequences unknown to his client 
which may flow from acceptance o f his advice if it proves to be wrong, he is not,
1 think, normally required to warn experienced business clients o f  the possibility 
that the opinion, although firmly held, may not in fact prevail. That follows 
inevitably from the fact that it is, as these plaintiffs must have known, a matter 
o f professional judgm ent. There was, o f  course, no need to advise on conse­
quences which might result from failure o f the proposed plan because these 
were best known to the clients: they would lose the money spent on it.49
Taylor J. was upheld on appeal. His reasoning on the duty to warn 
aspect of the claim was expressly approved.
What is most interesting about the decision is that it implicitly supports 
the implication of a warranty of fitness for purpose in a contract of profes­
sional service on the basis of the misrepresentation theory. Assume that 
the clients had not been experienced business people and hence could not 
be said to have appreciated that conduct suggesting a representation of 
effectiveness was only an opinion. It seems that the lawyer is then under 
a duty to give some sort of explicit warning to this effect. He cannot simply 
rely on the defence that he exercised reasonable care in performing his 
services. If the required warning is not given (either expressly or by im-
« / bid., at 354.
*Vbid.. at 356-57.
” lbid.. at 352.
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plication), the client is viewed as having been misled into his purchase of 
the service in reliance on the misrepresentation inherent in his solicitor’s 
conduct that it will be reasonably fit for its purpose. Precisely the same 
ingredients which support the implication of a warranty under the mis­
representation theory go into liability based on breach of a duty to warn. 
One is the m irror image of the other and to negate the possibility that 
there may be an implied warranty of fitness in a contract of professional 
service without clear evidence of a common contractual intention is to 
negate the existence of any duty to warn.
O f course, one can safely surmise that where a claim is made, as in 
Ormindale, for $5,500,000 in lost profits, a court will be quick to find, as in 
Ormindale, that the client was not relying, even absent any explicit qualifi­
cation, on the professional to provide a service effective for its intended 
purpose. The nature of the damages claimed in that case suggests one 
reason why the courts are, and should be, reluctant to imply a warranty of 
effectiveness in contracts of pure professional service.
Where the professional is employed to produce something tangible, 
both the fee charged the client and the value of the product which he 
reasonably expects to receive is measured by reference to its intrinsic com­
ponents: the cost of the materials and labour employed and the net profit 
to the professional. The same three components are utilized in determining 
the fee charged the client in a “pure” professional services contract (e.g., 
a mortgage, a deed, a trust document). However, in this case its value to 
the client is measured by reference to extrinsic factors e.g., $1,000.00 charged 
for a mortgage securing a loan of $100,000.00; e.g., $200,000 charged for 
an opinion which, if correct, will net the client a profit of $5,500,000.
If the product turns out to be unfit for its purpose, the pnm a facie risk 
which the implication of a warranty imposes on the professional in the first 
case is that he is denied his fee. This is not an unreasonable proposition 
given that the client has received a worthless article for his money. I'he 
client also gets no value for his money in the second case. However, the 
pnm a facie risk which the implication of a warranty would shift to the 
professional here is of a considerably greater magnitude. Consequently, 
greater justification is necessary to support a finding that this result rep­
resented either the common intention of the parties or the reasonable 
expectations of the client, depending on whether the contract theory or 
the misrepresentation theory of implied warranty is employed. As Taylor 
J. surmised in O rm indale: “1 cannot accept that the plaintiffs really believed 
that their lawyers had found a means by which, with timely action, a gain 
of $5,500,000 was certain.”50
What of the case where, as in Greaves,51 the professional sells only his 
design services which are then incorporated by a contractor into the finished
w/bid.,
i]Supra, foom ote 28.
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product? In this case, the fee charged will obviously be much less than the 
value of the ultimate prim a facie loss and hence the professional’s prima facie  
liability. This apparent exception is mandated by the idiosyncracies inher­
ent in string contracts. The claim made against the professional results 
from the fact that his client was in turn responsible to the owner under a 
contract in which the consideration paid for the product did  reflect the 
value of its intrinsic components and hence one in which the implication 
of a warranty was not unreasonable. If the professional was aware of the 
ultimate objective of his design, it is not unreasonable to imply a similar 
contractual obligation on his part. To do otherwise “could result in the 
contractor being under a strict duty to the employer as regards design but 
only able to pass on liability to the consultant responsible for the design if 
there was negligence”.52
There is another aspect to the nature of the damages likely to be 
claimed which may also justify a difference in the judicial treatment of 
pure services contracts and those related to the production of tangibles. In 
the latter case, if the service sold turns out to be unfit for its purpose, the 
unsuitability may well cause serious personal injury; e.g., a defective design 
which results in the collapse of a quarter-mile high telecommunications 
tower.53 The law favours shifting the risk of this kind of damage to the 
person who creates and profits from it — witness the products liability 
evolution — and we should not be surprised to see an analogous approach 
in the services context.
A third basis discerned for the implication of the sales warranties was 
purely policy. As between the innocent buyer and the innocent (i.e., non- 
negligent, non fraudulent) seller, the risk that the goods will be unsuitable 
should be placed on the seller because he is in a superior position to initially 
prevent, contractually assess, immediately bear and ultimately distribute it. 
That presumption certainly reflects the judicial and legislative approach to 
consumer transactions. This is most dramatically evidenced by the antipathy 
expressed at both levels towards the use of disclaimers.54 The question has 
become “who should bear the risk?”, not “who has agreed to bear the risk?”
In the context of commercial dealings, however, an opposite trend is 
emerging. The modern emphasis is against any presumption that one party 
has assumed a particular risk and in favour of a painstaking examination 
of the terms of the bargain.55 We can surmise that one reason for this 
judicial reversion to classic notions of contract is a recognition of the enor-
MFor exam ple, the Consumer Product W arranty and Liability Act, S.N'.B. 1978, c. C-18.1, ss. 24-26, prohibits 
the exclusion, in transactions fo r the  sale o r supply o f  a consum er p roduct, o f  the w arranties o r rem edies 
given by the  Act w here the loss su ffered  is a "consum er loss”, i.e., a loss not su lfe red  in a business capacity.
i2Supra, footnote 27.
siSuf>ra, footnote 15.
i5Photo Production Ltd. v. Secuncor Tpt. Ltd. [1980] 2 W.L.R. 283 (H.L.)
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mous consequential financial losses which can result in the commercial 
context when a contractual performance does not net its anticipated results. 
In this climate, there is no ground for presuming that one party by his 
very status is necessarily better able to bear or distribute such losses.
Perhaps at this broad policy level, then, it is possible to analogize con­
tracts for the sale of goods and contracts of professional service of the type 
we have been discussing. On the one hand, given the nature of the prima  
facie  losses liable to result in the latter case, there is less reason for the law 
to assume that the professional has impliedly warranted the fitness of his 
service for its intended purpose or that this represents the client’s reason­
able commercial expectations. However, two examples were given earlier 
of cases in the legal services context where that assumption is arguably 
overcome: the unqualified mortgage transaction and the failure of a sol­
icitor to advise a client inexperienced in business affairs that his recom­
mendation is based only on an opinion and hence inherently qualified. It 
is significant that the first example involved a commonplace consumer 
transaction and the second a consumer-type client. Just as the consequential 
economic loss suffered by a consumer buyer of goods is not of the mag­
nitude found in commercial sales, the same is likely to be true in the 
professional services context. Just as the business buyer of goods is better 
equipped to appreciate and assess the existence of inherent risks than his 
consumer counterpart, the same is likely to be true in the professional 
services context. It is suggested that the m odern tendency to protect the 
reasonble expectations of the consumer will be paramount in any extension 
of implied warranty theory to the pure professional services context.
CATHERINE WALSH*
*B.A. (Dalhousie), LL.B. (U .N .B .), B.C.L. (O xon). Assistant Professor, Faculty o f  L.aw, University o f  New 
Brunswick.
